As the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) protects some 650 million persons with disabilities. The CRPD also has an opportunity
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to progressively reconfigure the structure and process of human rights oversight. While the overall framework for monitoring and implementing the CRPD resembles existing core human rights instruments, it has some notable features. The CPRD Committee is endowed with several innovations of significant potential, especially in the breadth of reporting and investigative procedures, thereby offering prospects for other treaty bodies and the human rights system more generally. Accordingly, this article examines the development of the CRPD Committee and assesses its potential for invigorating future United Nations monitoring reforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD or Convention) 1 has an opportunity to progressively reconfigure the structure and process of human rights oversight. 2 The Convention was opened for signature on 30 March 2007, and entered into force on 3 May 2008.
3 On 3 November 2008, a monitoring Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Committee) was elected during the initial Conference of States Parties 4 to protect the rights of the world's largest minority, some 650 million persons with disabilities. 5 The overall framework for monitoring and implementing the Convention resembles existing core human rights instruments, particularly the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance that was adopted eight days after the adoption of the CRPD. 6 At the same time, the Committee is endowed with several notable innovations of significant potential, especially in the breadth of reporting and investigative
1.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 13 Dec. procedures, thereby offering prospects for other treaty bodies and the human rights system more generally. 7 Accordingly, this article examines the development of the CRPD Committee and assesses its potential for invigorating future United Nations monitoring reforms.
Part I of the article describes the Committee established by the United Nations to scrutinize the CRPD and highlights the Committee's advances over other human rights treaty bodies. Next, Part II looks at monitoring innovations that were suggested during the CRPD negotiations at a time when treaty body reform was a major subtext, but were not ultimately incorporated into the final instrument. In so doing, Part II considers how adoption of some of these oversight procedures could have affected broader human rights treaty reform efforts at the United Nations. Finally, Part III suggests creative avenues through which the Committee may yet progressively shape the direction of human rights treaty monitoring.
II. THE CRPD COMMITTEE

A. background to Proposals
During negotiation sessions leading to adoption of the CRPD, a number of monitoring and implementation proposals were submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for negotiating the draft treaty. 8 Consequently, the CRPD travaux préparatoires disclose a relatively wide range of viewpoints by states, Disabled Persons Organizations (DPOs), nongovernmental organiza-
7.
For an exhaustive account of the Committee's processes, see Janet E. CRPD drafters thought it would behoove a new treaty monitoring body to act as a test laboratory for intrepid processes.
12
The Committee's origin thus reflects the struggle to establish an effective monitoring mechanism that avoided pitfalls of the current system. This tension served to delay negotiations on monitoring until the Ad Hoc Committee's penultimate session; 13 in turn, the constricted time allotted to discussions encouraged a conservative result.
14 Hence, although a number of the suggested and politically manipulated institutions of the United Nations. 16 with some significant innovations culled from the tabled proposals. 17 In its details, however, the monitoring provisions reflect the desire of the drafters to innovate towards the remediation of existing treaty body deficits and espouse many of the suggestions of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
18
b. The Committee
The Committee was initially constituted of twelve experts but the pace of state ratification allowed it to expand to its maximum authorized number of eighteen experts. 19 The criteria for Committee experts, who serve in their individual capacity, require a person to be competent, experienced, and possess high moral standing. 20 Committee members are elected to four-year terms and are eligible once for re-election. 21 Significantly, the incorporation of term limits is designed to ensure the vitality, impartiality, and independence of the Committee and respond to critiques that the absence of term limits in most treaty bodies compromises the long-term independence of the body and can serve to inhibit its dynamism.
22
States parties are encouraged to consult closely with and actively involve persons with disabilities 23 in nominating their own nationals for committee election at Conferences of States Parties 24 and to give "due consideration" for representation by persons with disabilities on the monitoring body.
25
This last provision is at variance with established practice and responds to concerns, common to marginalized groups, that only effective participation by experts bearing their group membership characteristics can ensure effective implementation of rights.
26
The Committee's mandate in the context of disability parallels that of existing human rights treaty monitoring bodies. 27 It is tasked with implementing the Convention's stated purpose "to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent
20.
See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 34(3).
21.
See id. art. 34(7). One third of the originally elected experts were to have only two year terms, as selected by lottery.
22.
The imposition of term limits was supported by the OHCHR and was also reflected in the Enforced Disappearances Convention that was concurrently under negotiation. See OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 17; Enforced Disappearances Convention, supra note 6, pt. II, art. 26, ¶ 4.
23.
See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 4(3).
24.
See id. art. 34(5).
25.
See id. art. 34(3).
26.
See id.; cf. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 17 ("experts of high moral standing and competence in the field covered by the Convention" shall "serve in their personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of the different forms of civilization as well as the principal legal systems"). Note, too, the progressive development of overall composition criteria as reflected in the requirement that consideration be given to balanced gender representation in both the Enforced Disappearances Convention, supra note 6, art. 26(1), as well as the OPCAT, supra note 16, art. 5(4). It should be noted that proposals among some members of the disability community that the Committee be composed entirely of persons with disabilities, thereby underscoring the central importance of lived experience with disability, was not taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee, nor was the proposal that the Chair of the CRPD Committee be a person with a disability. 
Collective Complaints
The Committee is authorized to accept and deliberate upon individual and group communications regarding alleged violations of the CRPD 42 asserted against states parties to the Optional Protocol. 43 Communications may also be submitted on behalf of aggrieved individuals, thereby implying the involvement of DPOs, NGOs, and other advocates in advancing claims. 44 Otherwise, the admissibility of communications mirrors that of other international complaints procedures. 45 Likewise, the Committee may at any time after receiving a communication but before determining its merits, request a state party to adopt sufficient interim measures "to avoid possible irreparable damage" to the alleged victims of its actions. 46 The Committee's request, however, does not imply the ultimate admissibility or merits of the given communication. 47 Communication procedures are confidential and issued recommendations are not enforceable. 48 
DPO Participation
The participation of persons with disabilities and DPOs in Conventionrelated monitoring and implementation at all levels is both implicitly 49 reports. 52 These features together represent perhaps one of the most progressive developments in human rights law provided by the CRPD (even if stakeholder input is at times informally encouraged by other treaty bodies).
53
It reflects the fundamental principle that the persons most affected have the right to participate in decisions that impact them. In the disability context more specifically, it represents a sharp turn from marginalization and lack of voice in decisional processes. Moreover, the experience of the Ad Hoc Committee sessions demonstrates that including the targeted group facilitated negotiations by educating states representatives about these individuals as well as lending credibility to the substance of the treaty. 
Input from UN Specialized Agencies and Organs
To foment effective implementation of the CRPD, including international cooperation, the Committee is authorized to consult with "other relevant bodies instituted by international human rights treaties." 55 In particular, it envisages that the Committee will have due regard to the work of other treaty bodies whose work will necessarily overlap with it and also take into account the on-going interest in ensuring that the reporting process is meaningful without being duplicative. 56 The Committee is also encouraged to cooperate with United Nations specialized agencies and other organs.
57
These in turn are "entitled to be represented" during CRPD implementation, 58 which would include not only the reporting process but also Conferences of States Parties; moreover, they may be invited by the Committee to share technical assistance and to submit reports. 59 Such bodies are a potentially important resource for the Committee to tap into in order to effectively fulfill its mandate. Some of the specialized agencies possess considerable expertise in relation to particular issue areas covered by the Convention.
52.
Id. art. 35(4).
53.
Id. art. 4(3) (referencing the important role of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the development and implementation of legislation and policies that give effect to the CRPD). 54.
For more on the role of DPO participation in the CRPD drafting process and voice accountability, see Janet E. Subsequently, states parties must submit reports on at least a quadrennial basis. 62 The Committee is given the flexibility to request more frequent reports, which is distinct among human rights conventions negotiated prior to the CRPD. 63 The Committee's power to prescribe content guidelines makes explicit a practice that has developed over time and has been particularly effective in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 64 The role of the Committee in articulating reporting guidelines is a particularly important one and the Committee should take up the challenge to follow the best practices of existing treaty body practice in formulating and progressively developing over time its guidelines. 65 When appropriate the Committee may disseminate reports, along with its observations, recommendations, and requests for technical assistance or advice, to United Nations specialized entities "and other competent bodies." 
Conference of States Parties
CRPD Article 40 provides for periodic meetings of state parties to assess the implementation of the treaty, and is thus unique among core human rights conventions. 67 While previous human rights conventions reference meetings of states parties, these mechanisms are intended to be used for limited 60 .
Id. art. 35(1).
61.
Id. art. 35(5).
62.
Id. art. 35(2). 63.
For more on discretion in the context of treaty body reporting periodicity, see OHCHR Monitoring Overview, supra note 12, ¶ 16. The Human Rights Committee has adopted similar procedures, although it has yet to implement them. 64.
CRPD, supra note 1, art. 69 This is because they are meant to facilitate implementation by drawing together a wide range of actors, including states parties, relevant United Nations agencies, DPOs, NGOs, and others to provide a forum for discussion and reflection on how to best operationalize the Convention.
70
Consensus by the states parties on politically charged issues might obviate the type of criticisms lodged against the Human Rights Committee that it stretched its mandate by claiming implied powers.
III. ALTERNATIVE CRPD MONITORING PROPOSALS
Negotiation of the CRPD offered the prospect for developing an innovative monitoring scheme that departed significantly from standard human rights monitoring approaches, and significant innovations were incorporated. Nevertheless, because the monitoring debate was deferred until the last Ad Hoc session, when strong concerns arose about concluding the negotiations before consensus unraveled, in the end creativity gave way to expediency.
71
One might take the view that this is water under the bridge, and yet it stands to reason that alternative proposals floated during the CRPD negotiations could well inform ongoing dialogue on monitoring in continuing discussions on human rights treaty body reform. Accordingly, the discussion that follows highlights some of the key alterative options put forward during CRPD negotiations, while Part IV offers suggestions on how such innovations could yet be realized.
A. The Ad Hoc Drafters as Agents of Change
The drafters of the CRPD understood that the vast majority of states did not have comprehensive disability legislation. Further, drafters recognized that 68.
The Mexican draft convention text was the first to include the broad conceptualization of all too often existing legislation was very narrow in scope and reflected a medical/charity model rather than a rights-based approach to disability.
72
It was thus readily acknowledged that a new monitoring mechanism must do more than monitor existing laws. It must be equipped to provide technical assistance to states in the development of new legislation and, where applicable, in improving and enforcing existing legislation in line with the CRPD. Relatedly, and somewhat unlike the situation with other marginalized groups such as women, children, and racial minorities, most states do not have anything approaching reliable statistics and data of populations of person with disabilities. Statistical information is considered fundamental for supporting implementation. Lack of empirically verifiable data helped stimulate the idea that a monitoring mechanism should contribute to the creation of accurate in-country databases that in turn could enhance the capacity of states to craft responsive public policies. Finally, a new monitoring mechanism was regarded as a core component of addressing gaps caused by the lack of engagement by existing treaty bodies in disability rights issues coupled with the non-participation of DPOs in the UN human rights system in any sustained way. Some of the proposals tabled before the Ad Hoc Committee, but ultimately not taken up or reflected in the final text in their entirety, sought to help transform the existing system of monitoring and implementation into a more proactive and robust framework. Should these be acted upon, either through formal UN reform or (more likely) procedurally by the Committee, they can help reshape human rights treaty monitoring and implementation in a progressive direction.
b. National Action Plans and NHRI Advocacy on Monitoring
One of the more comprehensive and creative schemes for monitoring the future treaty was suggested at the sixth Ad Hoc Committee session by the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions 73 and taken up with enthusiasm by experts who convened to consider monitoring approaches. The NHRIs proposed an international monitoring body comprised of a majority of persons with disabilities 75 that would consult with DPOs 76 and be assisted in its duties by a global disability rights advocate. 77 The proposed committee would have been able to examine the situation of persons with disabilities by receiving collective complaints, 78 by applying its own proactive inquiries, 79 and through regional assessments.
80
A particularly far-reaching innovation required states parties to submit national action plans, which are a core feature of disability rights implementation in Australia and heavily touted by Australian NHRI and NGO representatives. 81 The rationale for this proposal was the view that national action plans can serve as an anchor for monitoring compliance with obligations. The process by which national action plans are developed triggers governments to think of how they will implement and what priorities they have given their own situation. 82 Thus, under this mechanism, development of the plans could have provided a centerpiece for monitoring; completed plans might have provided guidance for a treaty monitoring body in an individualized examination of treaty implementation by a state party. An additional advantage is that the explicit incorporation of national level planning within the framework of the CRPD could help to shift the focus of implementation away from the singular focus on reporting. Given the emergence of national human rights action planning as a core strategy of NHRIs, 84 the explicit mention of action plans within the context of national-level implementation of the CRPD could have underscored the role of those institutions in securing disability inclusion. As it stands, absent any explicit language to this effect, it will be up to governments, DPOs, and NHRIs acting on their own initiative to integrate disability rights into national human rights action plan monitoring schemes or to foster disability-specific human rights action planning. The Committee may yet take up this idea and make it part and parcel of its iterative communication with states parties in the reporting process. More helpfully, perhaps, would be the role that the Committee could play in providing specific guidance on disability-specific action planning in the form of a general comment.
Finally, it should be noted that treaty reform dialogue has generated some ideas for strengthening the role of NHRIs in treaty body processes, again, issues that could have been taken up by the CRPD drafters. 85 Moreover, several of the treaty bodies have issued general comments concerning the role of NHRIs. The potential for cross-fertilization has yet to be realized.
86
C. Other Treaty body Reporting Innovations
The production of a report to a treaty body is intended to generate a dialogue within civil society about the requirements of the treaty, the application of the standards to local conditions, the shortfalls in compliance, priorities for Human rights treaties require that the signatory states ensure the rights protected to all persons without discrimination. Within this context, the American Convention and other human rights instruments specifically prohibit States from discriminating against persons on the basis of their 'economic status.' States must protect and ensure the human rights of those subject to their jurisdiction whether they are poor or rich.
84.
On national human rights action plans generally, see U.n. redress, and the design of a plan of action. 87 A cycle of pre-report consultation followed by post-report planning at the national level is supposed to be created via the periodic drafting of state reports.
88 In practice this national-level planning has not always happened. Instead, report drafting, often done in backrooms without stakeholder engagement, has become the chief focus of national-level activity in connection with the human rights treaty reporting system. 89 The NHRI proposal for national action plans was in part a response to this weakness in the traditional treaty body reporting process. Other proposals were put forward to tackle this issue, drawing in part on practices that have evolved in other international law contexts. 90 One of the more creative ideas originated in an informal request by Costa Rica for experts to look carefully at possible alternatives to the standard treaty body reporting schemes. Consequently, the Regional Group for Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC) through the Costa Rican Permanent Mission commissioned a paper 91 on monitoring, that, among other things, suggested that the monitoring system utilized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 92 was worthy of study and adaptation. The IMF utilizes a thematic, targeted approach that includes visitation by experts and constructive dialogue with the state under review, rather than traditional state-based reporting. 93 Under this approach, a treaty body might conduct a certain number of reports within each region per year and would be able to call for more targeted reporting in place of periodic reporting at fixed intervals. 94 Under this "reverse reporting" system, an entity other than the state under scrutiny prepares a report reviewing compliance commitments, based on
87.
See Elements that bring about sustained reform included . . . [i]ntegrating the debt management reform process into broader programs, such as public sector or public financial management reforms. One benefit to this approach is that it helps ensure project sustainability and continuity through financing, support by experts, and project supervision.
94.
For discussion of the periodicity of the current reporting process, see OHCHR Monitoring Overview, supra note 12, ¶ 14 & tbl.2.
dialogue between the reviewing body and the government concerned. In this way, monitoring moves beyond self-reporting and self-certification to forms of external monitoring. A group of experts convened at the American University, School of International Service, took this line of research farther and studied other types of peer review or "reverse reporting" mechanisms. 95 Models noted for possible adaptation in a human rights context included the system adopted by the World Trade Organization by its Trade Policy Review Body 96 and the OECD peer review system. 97 This system of peer review mechanisms received attention in the OHCHR report on monitoring options for the CRPD.
98 Such an approach might well have facilitated a deeper level of exchange, something the drafters recognized as important in the context of a complex and comprehensive treaty cutting across so many issues. Thus, for example, in international law contexts where peer review is used, it can serve to check compliance or, alternatively, to facilitate implementation by establishing a cooperative framework. In the nuclear safety context, peer review is used in two ways. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) utilize peer review in their safety review services, which involve the technical, on-site review of nuclear installations by nuclear plant operators. 99 Another approach is embodied in the Convention on Nuclear Safety 100 designed to monitor state compliance with the provisions of the treaty. 101 The peer review system in the Convention on Nuclear Safety focuses
95.
See Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 8-11. 96.
Id. at 9.
97.
Id. at 9-10.
98.
See OCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ ¶ 67-72 ("A peer review mechanism involving systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a State by other States, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve its policy making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards and principles may also be a valuable monitoring tool."). Id ¶ 67. 99.
Under the IAEA system, a member state makes an official request to the IAEA concerning a particular nuclear facility in the state. Next, a preparatory meeting with the regulatory body and plant management occurs, followed by the recruitment of external experts, usually by the IAEA staff member leading the mission. Finally, technical preparation of the review mission begins. In some cases the plant is expected first to carry out an in-depth self-assessment of its management and operational practices. During the peer evaluation, expert missions conduct on-site evaluations of the nuclear facility and compare the domestic regulatory practices with the pertinent international guidelines. on states' behavior vis-à-vis the establishment of regulatory frameworks consistent with their treaty obligations.
102
While the Convention on Nuclear Safety does not purport to create the kind of specific international standards familiar to other treaty regimes, the system of incentives and accountability created by its peer review model was designed to facilitate the gradual phasing-in of standards promulgated by the IAEA. Thus, its model offers a type of review that is less adversarial than standard compliance-monitoring systems and more cooperative in the sense of providing a means of assisting nuclear operators with the application of commonly accepted international practices.
The American University group further proposed that consideration be given to targeted inspections, thematic inquiries, and fact-finding under which certain thematic issue areas might be identified for external monitoring by fact-finding teams or inspection panels. 103 Under this model, procedures would be focused; while they would not try to assess compliance across the board, they would set priorities for inspection, thereby making the process more efficient and effective. The primary models cited for this process were those which monitor prison conditions and the prevention of torture.
104 It was also suggested that external monitoring might take the form of "challenge inspections" whereby a state might self-certify compliance with treaty obligations in a particular area (e.g., prison conditions for detainees with disabilities or conditions in institutions), and others, such as another state party, NGOs, or a treaty body, could challenge the veracity of the report and a neutral entity conduct the inspection.
105
These approaches are consistent with a core theme regarding the successful implementation of the CRPD upheld by many during the treaty negotiation, namely, that effective implementation would require carrots and sticks. Indeed, many proposals for treaty body reform within the UN human rights system have emphasized that effective implementation rests not only with adversarial processes of engagement, but likewise with more creative and cooperative mechanisms that facilitate implementation through incentives for compliance. 
E. Regional Engagement
The issue of regional-level engagement on disability issues and, in particular, CRPD implementation, was the focus of intense lobbying among some participants. An early monitoring proposal in the Bangkok draft clearly emanated from the successful work in the Asia Pacific region under the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and its Decade on Disabled Persons. 112 This proposal required the treaty body to meet periodically within the regions under the auspices of existing regional commissions. 113 Similarly, other proposals reflected the recent practice of the OHCHR and its regional engagement for treaty body follow-up procedures. 114 A number of activities were carried out to facilitate and enhance implementation of treaty body recommendations at the country level. Three national follow-up workshops were convened in Croatia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka and one global training session for participants from five countries was held in Geneva in May for representatives of NGOs, national human rights institutions regional meetings to follow up on various treaty bodies' concluding observations as a means for government actors and civil society to participate in these international processes. 115 Some cautioned against taking the concept of regional implementation too far, stating that while regional dialogue and information sharing should be encouraged, a monitoring system that leads to regional interpretations of an international convention--and therefore potentially conflicting jurisprudence--may not be desirable. 116 Still, the opportunity to ensure some level of engagement among states on CRPD implementation at the regional level through explicit language in the text was lost. Also gone was the potential for dialogue that might foster information sharing and knowledge transfer in what will most surely be a busy period of law reform and development in the ratification phase. Given the dearth of appropriate disability law frameworks at the national level, particularly in view of ratification by the European Community, such an opportunity could have been fruitful. Nevertheless, regional cooperation has been growing, with a particularly strong example being the sponsoring of workshops and sharing of technical information and best practices by the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions.
117
F. Implementation Facilitation beyond Traditional Human Rights Monitoring Schemes
There is merit in exploring how traditional approaches to monitoring by human rights institutions could be usefully expanded to include components seen in other treaty contexts. This is particularly true for the practice of establishing technical advisory bodies, an issue discussed among some participants in the monitoring debates. In this context, proponents pointed to a number of environmental conventions that have established subsidiary and the media to encourage engagement with the human rights treaty body system. The global session followed national preparatory workshops in the five participating countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mauritius, Thailand, Uganda and Zambia.
Id.
A 
G. Financial Mechanism Proposals
Some participants during the CRPD development process emphasized the necessity of appropriate financial support to facilitate implementation. 123 Their assertions were bolstered by the fact that some eighty percent of persons with disabilities live in poverty in the developing world, 124 and that the vast majority of states, both developed and developing have little in the way of rights-based disability domestic law and policy frameworks. 125 Although many of the treaty obligations might be readily implemented without an extensive outlay of resources, the comprehensive nature of the treaty coupled with the undeveloped state of disability laws, policies, and programs will require financial resources. It was against this backdrop that the issue of financial support arose in various contexts throughout the negotiations. Much of the debate revolved around the controversial insertion of an article on international cooperation. 127 Several states took "international cooperation" as code for resource transfers from developed countries to developing countries. 128 This tension was resolved by the inclusion of a much weakened provision on international cooperation that removed language that would clearly obligate resource transfers.
129 There were, however, some informal discussions that sought to explore other avenues of financial support for implementation, including the establishment of new financial mechanisms or the engagement of existing ones. 130 One report reviewed progress made in the international environmental realm, where it is now readily recognized that the development of environmental rules and standards and the provision of financial resources to ensure their implementation all go hand in hand. 131 Thus, development of a financial mechanism, which might have taken the form of a voluntary fund, was put forward as a way to help foster technical assistance geared toward treaty implementation. 132 The language in Article 32 ensuring that development programming is made inclusive clearly contemplates appropriate resource allocation, such as building accessible schools and medical clinics, ensuring that persons with disabilities are included in HIV/AIDS and other health programming, and engaging DPOs in election processes, to name just a few obvious examples. Unfortunately, the opportunity of jump-starting implementation particularly in developing countries with seed or pilot funding was missed and it remains the case that some developing countries are wary of ratification (and additional human rights implementation), absent some measure of resource allocation.
IV. THE CRPD CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES AND CRPD COMMITTEE AS AGENTS OF UNITED NATIONS REFORM
Ultimately, the CRPD Committee together with the Conference of States Parties has the ability, within the context of their respective existing authority and mandates, to establish good practices that can inform broader human rights reform efforts within the United Nations. 133 The discussion that follows brings to the fore some illustrative innovations that may help to ensure effective 131. See Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 6, 14. Many funds have been established, most often within the framework of international environmental conventions, to further environmental protection goals, most typically on a voluntary basis. For example, the Global Environmental Facility, established in 1991 by the World Bank, the UN Environmental Programme, and the UN Development Programme, provides funds to help developing countries meet incremental costs of environmental protection measures relating to climate change, biological diversity, international waters, ozone layer depletion and persistent organic pollutants. It also serves as the financial mechanism for four international environmental treaties, and thus helps fund initiatives that assist developing countries in meeting the objectives of the conventions. Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 14. 132. One inspiration for looking into funding mechanism was the document entitled CRPD monitoring and implementation. At the same time, it is hoped this discourse will pave the way for enhanced human rights treaty monitoring and implementation more generally.
A. Invigorating the Conference of States Parties
Increasingly in international law domains, treaties provide for periodic Conference of States Parties for the purpose of assessing strengths and weakness in implementation, sharing information and data, and facilitating coordination and dialogue among all stakeholders, including NGOs. 134 Depending on how states parties choose to make Article 40 of the CRPD operational, the Conference of States Parties could well serve a function similar to established practice in the arms control and particularly international environmental law processes by achieving consensus on substantive issues. 135 The Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), as the co-Secretariat for the Convention, is tasked with servicing the Conferences of States Parties. Thus, the extent that Conferences of States Parties can promote policies and practices will rely heavily on the efficacy of DESA's management of those meetings. The OHCHR referred to the Mine Ban Treaty Meetings of states parties "as a forum to discuss issues, such as critical legal definitions, as well as develop further norms and quantitative goals and targets." 136 Because of this success, the OHCHR chose to highlight this institutional structure for consideration by CRPD drafters as a "global policy making mechanism." 137 Moreover, the Conference of States Parties could draw upon lessons in the environmental realm and use its convening power to stimulate resource allocation to implementation. Significantly, the autonomous institutional arrangements found in international environmental agreements-including conferences or meetings of states parties as well as subsidiary bodies-have played important roles in helping to develop the normative content of the regimes established under the treaty. They likewise have helped facilitate implementation, often through cooperative and facilitative mechanisms, as opposed to adversarial methods.
138 Such a dynamic might help avoid conflicts that might otherwise arise, for example, from differing views between developed and developing states as to the extent of resource allocation.
A salient, albeit modest, example from which to draw is the Quick Start Programme initiated by the International Conference on Chemicals Man- agement to implement the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM). 139 Quick Start was intended to provide seed money in support of initial capacity-building and implementation activities in developing countries and, while it is time-limited and its funds are modest, there is scope for developing countries to access assistance that can further implementation of their chemical management obligations. 140 Moreover, the SAICM encourages developing countries to integrate SAICM objectives into their requests for development assistance and indicates that technical support to help them do this will be provided if needed.
141 Absent politics, there is nothing precluding the Conference of States Parties from establishing a similar initiative with the CRPD.
b. Introducing a Regional Dimension to CRPD Monitoring and Implementation
While in the end drafters implicitly accepted the argument that the global scrutiny offered by an international treaty body was preferable to regional monitoring, it may benefit the new CRPD Committee and the OHCHR in its Secretariat role to support regional engagement of the type now practiced in relation to the implementation of Convention on the Rights of the Child, which liaises with UNICEF and other entities to achieve progress on the ground. 142 The Bangkok CRPD draft proposal implicitly acknowledges the potential role that the regions could play in implementation, through a procedure whereby the treaty body would meet periodically within the regions, under the auspices or umbrella of existing regional commissions.
143
One currently discussed proposal is a Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and Pacific that would provide regional data, as well as interpretive guidance on cultural implications of the CRPD. 
C. Treaty Committee Experts
The review of existing treaty bodies within the United Nations human rights system reveals differential levels of expertise and independence among Committee members. Moreover, some members' heavy workloads outside of their Committee responsibilities result in disparate degrees of productivity. In addition, the existing treaty bodies disclose an inadequate representational diversity, leading some proponents of treaty body reform to advocate in favor of a "global search process" overseen by the OHCHR to help establish diversity criteria and help identify suitable candidates.
145
The drafters of the CRPD did not take suggestions for an enhanced vetting process nor the idea put forward by the OHCHR for the inclusion of a review procedure within the states parties nomination process to ensure sufficient expertise and qualifications. 146 It is hoped that such a process could yet be developed, perhaps pursuant to a decision of a Conference of States Parties. 147 It is likewise hoped that the Committee will be comprised principally of experts with disabilities, all of whom have relevant experience and expertise in human rights and disability law and policy.
D. NGO Participation in CRPD Monitoring and Implementation
Drafters clearly contemplated an active role for NGOs in the work of the Committee, which is consonant with the role that NGOs-and DPOs in particular-played in the drafting of the CRPD. Article 38 authorizes the Committee to invite "other competent bodies as it may consider appropriate to provide expert advice on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities." 148 This mandate, inter alia, enables the Committee to receive and consider information and advice submitted by civil society organizations in various formats, including written submissions (such as shadow reports) and oral interventions. demonstrated that NGO participation is paramount in ensuring that treaty bodies receive useful and credible information as a means of facilitating human rights implementation. 150 Trenchantly, communications on behalf of aggrieved individuals (including collective/systemic ones) may be submitted to the Committee. Individuals may also directly submit their complaints. This reporting system increases the prospect of civil society's participation in rights monitoring.
151
E. International Cooperation
Article 32 of the CRPD makes it clear that all international cooperation efforts, including international development programs, should be accessible and fully inclusive of persons with disabilities.
152 Specifically, all states parties are required to completely integrate persons with disabilities in all aspects of their aid programs-from design through implementation and evaluation. As characterized by one leading commentator, "States Parties have a duty to proof their development aid programmes from the perspective of the rights contained in the Convention." 153 The Committee can make this essential requirement operational by questioning states on the measures they have undertaken to ensure that international development programs (whether donor or recipient) are inclusive of persons with disabilities. While the Convention provides no specific guidance on the extent to which it corresponds to the principles and values of other international instruments and processes of development or for making this requirement operational, the Conference of States Parties would be an ideal vehicle for following up on this requirement, as well as a forum for sharing best practices in inclusive development in various sectors. 
F. Forging Linkages with Other bodies
The work of the United Nations system on the advancement of the rights of persons with disabilities extends well beyond the CRPD and its attendant monitoring mechanisms. Disability is a cross-cutting issue that should be part and parcel of the work of all United Nations programs. Moreover, there are a number of international, as well as regional, intergovernmental bodies that have some form of responsibility in the issue areas covered by the CRPD, several of which have monitoring responsibilities relating to disability rights. 155 While the CRPD does contain a provision in Article 38 regarding the relationships of the Committee to other bodies, the type of detailed guidance envisaged by the OHCHR 156 was not included. In choosing to chart out its relationship with other UN bodies and mechanisms, the Committee could help achieve the broad vision of the CRPD toward greater inclusion of the human rights of persons with disabilities in law, policy and programming.
Likewise, the Committee can break new ground in realizing the promise of engagement with NHRIs whose contemplated role in national level monitoring can and should be reinforced through the Committee's efforts. This is so especially in view of the important progress already being done within the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs around CRPD implementation. 157 The Committee could draw from the experience of the CRC Committee and articulate guidelines for the participation of partners in its work in a proactive effort to promote engagement that is meaningful and substantive. rights monitoring systems to initiate investigations regarding egregious or systematic human rights violations. 160 In such cases, the Committee shall call on that state party to collaborate in an investigation and submit its observations 161 for review. 162 The CRPD includes in its Optional Protocol a procedure of inquiry, 163 employed within some human rights monitoring systems, to allow human rights monitoring systems to initiate investigations, particularly regarding egregious or systematic human rights violations. 164 A procedure of inquiry is triggered in cases where the Committee receives "reliable" information relating to "grave or systematic violations by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention."
165 One might well imagine, for example, an inquiry concerning the institutionalization of persons with disabilities or the systematic exclusion of disabled children from schools. In such cases, the Committee shall call on that state party to collaborate in an investigation of the situation and submit its observations. 166 Thereafter, the Committee reviews the information submitted by the state party and other reliable information submitted by other parties.
167
The Committee may choose to authorize one or more of its members to conduct an inquiry and report "urgently" to the Committee. 168 Such an inquiry may include a visit to the territory of the state party subject to consent of the state party (consent being a standard principle of international legal process). The findings of any such inquiry are sent to the state party, along with Committee "comments and recommendations." 169 The state party is given an opportunity to respond within six months. 170 The procedure is confidential; accordingly, the proceedings are entirely closed and the written findings are not made public. 171 The Committee may solicit the state party after six months to appraise it of what measures it assumed in reply to the inquiry, 172 and may invite the state party to include details of these measures in its habitual CRPD report. Such follow-up procedures in relation to communications or inquiry mechanisms enhance compliance with recommendations and other measures. Whether the Committee will proactively engage in such follow-up will depend upon the resources at its disposal, as well as the manner in which it perceives its mandate. It must be underscored, however, that the efficacy of any procedural innovations related to reporting will be determined by the extent that the Committee follows up on these measures. For example, the Committee could assign one or more members specifically to follow up with states; the elicited information would then be made publically available for use by civil society and other monitoring agents. It is not clear whether the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on Disability will continue to be renewed indefinitely now that the CRPD is in place and operational. Nonetheless, assuming the future existence of the office and drawing from the experience of special rapporteurs created within the framework of the United Nations human rights system and serviced by the OHCHR, there are ways in which the Special Rapporteur on Disability could relate to the new convention implementation structure (and the United Nations human rights system more generally) and use the office to ensure that existing instruments on disability are understood and operationalized consistent with the CRPD. 178 It should be noted, however, that proposals to make the Special Rapporteur on Disability an ex officio member of the Committee received little support during the course of the negotiations and no specific reference was made to the Special Rapporteur in the final convention text. 179 Although this may not be a bad omission, issues relating to overlap and coordination-not to mention the continued existence of the Special Rapporteur on Disability and the role of the Human Rights Committee in appointment of such individuals-must be addressed in future. The proposal by the OHCHR for a provision providing detailed guidance on the relationship between the different mechanisms, such as the thematic procedures, 180 was not taken up. Likewise, the proposal by the OHCHR for a specific provision to address the relationship between the Committee and the Special Rapporteur on Disability went unaddressed. 181 However, the Committee, working together with the OHCHR and DESA, could address this gap.
H. CRPD
I. General Principles and the Animation of Monitoring and Implementation
The CRPD stands out among core international human rights conventions in its articulation of general principles, which are set forth in a separate article. 182 Although the explicit articulation of general principles is a common feature of international environmental agreements 183 and other framework conventions, 184 human rights conventions have not contained specific provisions outlining general principles. At best, treaty bodies have identified such principles, as in the case of the CRC. 185 The Committee will need to explicate the application of the general principles across the treaty text for states parties, including in the realm of monitoring and implementation. This may be accomplished not only through the review of states parties reports, but likewise in the formulation of general comments on the treaty text. 186 Thus, in keeping with the suggestions put forward in the context of drafting the CRPD monitoring mechanism, the Committee will need to ensure that, "[a]s an overarching principle . . . [the] monitoring mechanism must provide full participation for persons with disabilities, both in terms of access and participation in the monitoring process, including with respect to meeting venues, documentation and interpretation." 187 The initial meeting of the Committee on Disability suggests that states parties are indeed looking for guidance on the interpretation of the text and other types of assistance related to the explication of their obligations. 188 Ultimately, the efficacy of these proposals will depend on the Experts themselves, and the extent to which they commit to proactive roles.
J. Process and Working Methods
In relation to its process and working methods, the Committee may wish to emulate best practices from existing treaty bodies, as well as incorporate suggested reforms. 189 For example, one commentator has advocated increas-ing the efficiency of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination body by adopting procedural rules that allow the Chair to solely congratulate states representatives for their participation, mandate convening sessions on time, 190 delegate work in advance of formal sessions, and limit non-pertinent interventions by members. 191 Such proposals, formulated in the context of treaty body practice, should make their way into the development of the Committee working methods as appropriate. These ostensibly mundane matters assume significance when one considers the daunting time constraints of human rights treaty bodies. The following five sub-sections set forth procedural powers of the Committee and flexible adaptations of working methods to advance CRPD implementation.
Working Methods to Focus on Thematic Issues
Other potential measures for enhancing the Committee's productivity through procedural rules might include authorizing the creation of subsidiary bodies such as working, thematic, and technical advisory sub-groups. Within the context of the Committee's work, it might be useful to commission subgroups on specialized issues such as legal capacity or election access for persons with disabilities and to have these entities supported in their tasks by bodies authorized under the CRPD. 192 These working methods may be particularly important given the traditional dearth of meeting time allocated for these bodies to conduct their work. 
Reporting Guidelines/Targeted Lists of Questions for Consideration
The role of the Committee in articulating reporting guidelines is a particularly important one and the Committee should take up the challenge to follow the best practices of existing treaty bodies in formulating its guidelines. 193 For example, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has specified reporting guidelines that are well-tailored to the specific obligations set forth in the CRC. 194 While the drafters did not take up the suggestion of the OHCHR to write into the text the authorization of the Committee to create lists of questions or issues specifically for a state party in the context of its reporting obligation, 195 the Committee has ample discretion to do so. Thus, for example, where a state is due for reporting and has specific widespread practices ostensibly at odds with the CRPD, such as congregate institutionalization or far-reaching guardianship laws stripping persons with disabilities of legal capacity, these issues could be brought to the attention of the reporting state party who could then come prepared to address these matters in substantive detail.
Late Reporting
In the event a report is "significantly overdue," the Committee may give the state party in question a three-month notice to submit a report in conjunction with its CRPD implementation. 196 This past due provision is a novel advance but does reflect an established, albeit relatively rare, practice among treaty monitoring bodies to review implementation in the absence of a report. This provision has the potential to facilitate and expedite state reporting accountability. 197 It is thus within the discretion of the Committee to take a more proactive role in addressing delinquency in reporting by states parties. In such cases, the Committee could invite NHRIs and NGOs to help fill in the reporting gap and provide these actors with the ability to appear before the Committee and participate in a dialogue regarding country conditions in the relevant non-reporting state. Taking this measure could create an incentive for state compliance in the absence of other enforcement mechanisms.
Communications
The Committee may, at any time after receiving a communication, but before determining its merits, request that a state party adopt sufficient interim measures "to avoid possible irreparable damage" to the alleged victims of its actions. 198 However, such action does not imply the ultimate admissibility or merits of the given communication. 199 The possibility of such precautionary measures is important and has been clearly demonstrated in a petition concerning the rights of persons with mental disabilities before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States. 200 That case also illustrated the proactive role that can be played by certain monitoring bodies, with the Commission converting an original individual complaint to one that encompassed all individuals institutionalized in the state facility. 
Central Clearing House/Unifier of Data Collection
Article 31 of the CRPD requires states parties to "collect appropriate information, including statistical and research data" in order to create and implement policies that give effect to the Convention. 206 The Article also outlines the standards to be used for the collection, maintenance and use of this information. 207 The drafters of the Convention were particularly concerned about the dearth of disability-specific statistics and data. 208 At the same time, the Ad Hoc Committee sought to balance the need to stimulate better practices in this context with the need to ensure that the process by which such data is collected and ultimately used, does not violate the rights of persons with disabilities. 209 The resulting text reflects these interests and the equilibrium desired. The task of the Committee will be to ensure, within the framework of the reporting process, that disability statistics data are collected and applied in keeping with Article 31. In this regard the Committee might take direction from the CRC Committee which references, in the context of its reporting guidelines, the need for statistical information as a means of effective implementation and monitoring. 210 Significantly, there is nothing to preclude the Conference of States Parties from taking on the role that many such institutional mechanisms play within the context of environmental or arms control treaties, insofar as they provide opportunities for setting benchmarks and quantitative goals and targets. In this sense, Conferences of States Parties could be utilized as a forum for information exchange based on data and dialogue on progressive tools to aid implementation, including, for example, disability rights budget analysis. Indeed, in order for the data and statistical vision of the CRPD to 206 . CRPD, supra note 1, art. 31(1). This provision appears to have its origins in the Bangkok Proposal, supra note 9, art. 33. 207. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 31(1).
The process of collecting and maintaining this information shall: (a) Comply with legally established safeguards, including legislation on data protection, to ensure confidentiality and respect for the privacy of persons with disabilities; (b) Comply with internationally accepted norms to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and ethical principles in the collection and use of statistics..
208.
See, e.g., Working Group Draft, supra note 13, n.23 (noting that the inclusion of an article on data and statistics was regarded as important as it "could allow States to respond more effectively to the needs of persons with disabilities and to have an accurate assessment of the situation of the persons concerned so as to implement programs for their benefit"). 209. Id. art. 6. The initial Working Group text reflects this tension insofar as it focuses heavily, to the point of repetition, on issues of privacy, confidentiality and the like in relation to disability data collection and use. See also the commentary on Article 6 referencing "repetition and redundancies." Janet E. be realized, it is clear that the national research and statistical capacities must be strengthened and further developed for the development, testing and use of Article 31 disability data collection instruments.
V. CONCLUSION
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities along with the CRPD Conference of States Parties has commenced operations at a time when the United Nations human rights treaty monitoring system is experiencing strong pressure for reform. The established human rights monitoring committees are beset by backlogs in the reporting process and face severe resource challenges that impact their ability to undertake the depth of analysis and engagement with states parties contemplated by their mandates. The CRPD's drafters were well aware of the challenges facing the treaty body system that will likewise face this newest committee. Accordingly, the drafters attempted to account for challenges by incorporating innovations in the resulting monitoring provisions. Yet, for reasons of political expediency coupled with time constraints that prevented a more considered negotiation process for the monitoring and implementation provisions, those drafters declined to adopt other far reaching mechanisms that could have addressed additional systemic flaws. Secretariat responsibilities are to be shared between Geneva and New York. Technical expertise on human rights and disability issues have been strengthened in both the OHCHR as well as DESA with the hiring of additional staff and engagement with DPOs and academic institutes committed to working on human rights and disability. Experience indicates that a progressive treaty body can make much of even minimalist monitoring and implementation provisions, and given the relatively broader scope offered by the mechanisms in the CRPD, a proactive Committee coupled with the enlightened support of the dual Secretariat structure can be expected to make significant progress towards the realization of the Convention's visionary framework. Moreover, the experience of international environmental law, particularly its pattern of developing creative institutional arrangements such as conferences or meetings of the parties and subsidiary bodies to facilitate cooperative implementation and develop the normative content of a treaty over time, provides ample lessons for the CRPD regime.
The CRPD text itself acknowledges the prospect of human rights treaty body reform, as reflected in Article 47. The prospect of a unified treaty body carries with it particular dangers for CRPD implementation. The Convention was negotiated in large part on the basis that the current system had utterly failed to address disability rights in any on-going, consistent, and competent manner. There is an undeniable tension between calls to adopt a compre-hensive and more holistic approach to treaty monitoring and the interest in developing expertise and specialization vis-à-vis specific human rights issue areas and the protection of groups subjected to egregious discrimination, including persons with disabilities as well as other marginalized groups. Any proposal that seeks to develop a unified body needs to address this tension clearly. Moreover, there would need to be some mechanism, even within a unified body, of addressing the specific barriers in relation to accessing human rights for, among others, women, racial minorities, children, and people with disabilities. A new system would need to reflect the principles of nondiscrimination, inclusion, and participation as well as account for diversity in a way that ensures meaningful--as opposed to superficial--coverage of the rights of all persons.
